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CASE COMMENTS
quirements. It remains to be seen whether the states will be
able to draft statutes which will comply with the safeguards
the Court sets forth.
Constitutional Law: Right to Counsel on Collateral Attack
Defendant, one year after being sentenced to prison for em-
bezzlement, collaterally attacked his conviction on the ground
that his plea of guilty had been illegally coerced. Annexed to
his motion to vacate sentence was a statement of his indigency,
and a request to be provided counsel at the hearing on his motion.
The lower court denied both a hearing on the motion to vacate
and the request for counsel. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Alaska reversed and remanded, holding that an indigent has the
constitutional right to counsel at a hearing on his collateral
attack motion. Nichols v. State, 425 P.2d 247 (Alas. 1967).
Although the Constitution guarantees every individual ac-
cused of a crime the right to a fair trial, it has been held that
this guarantee does not afford a convicted person the right to
appellate review.' However, in the Anglo-American legal sys-
tem, direct appellate review of criminal convictions has tradi-
tionally been recognized and provided by both the states and the
federal courts. 2 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that
when the state provides such an appellate review procedure, the
state must also furnish counsel for any indigent on direct appeal.3
On such direct appeal any error in the trial record may be raised.
1. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Baldwin
v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931) (no constitu-
tional right to appellate review if due process provided at trial); Ex
parte Abdu, 247 U.S. 27 (1918) (appellate review not a necessary part
of a legal system); Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1936);
United States v. Marrone, 172 F. Supp. 368 (D. Alas. 1959).
2. John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583 (1913). The power rests with
each state to prescribe the jurisdiction of its appellate courts. State
ex rel. Cartmel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 84 Fla. 123, 92 So. 871 (1922)
(a state may make its own rules of criminal procedure); People v. Dunn,
157 N.Y. 528, 52 N.E. 572 (1899); Sullivan v. Haug, 82 Mich. 548, 46 N.W.
795 (1890). See also Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Pro-
ceedings, 45 Mmbx. L. REV. 783 (1961).
3. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The federal courts
have made appointment of counsel on appeal mandatory for some time.
Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957). Accord, Ridge, The
Indigent Defendant, 24 F.R.D. 241 (1960). See also ATr'Y GEx., REPORT
oN POVERTY AND THE AnMnmTRATiON OF CRnwmiAL JusTicE (1963)
(known as the Allen Committee Report); Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (1964).
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The major limitation of direct appeal is that the right is lost
shortly after conviction.4
A second avenue through which the convicted may have
certain issues reviewed is by collateral attack of the conviction.
Under this procedure the highest order of remedy available is
the writ of habeas corpus.8 A habeas corpus petition may in-
quire as to the jurisdiction of the court, issues outside the record,
and other major issues under the Constitution or laws of the
United States to determine whether a person has been illegally
deprived of his liberty." Since it is a collateral attack remedy,
the granting of relief is at the discretion of the court 7 and, be-
cause it is a summary proceeding to examine the validity of a
conviction, it is not available until all other direct and collateral
remedies have been exhausted.8
Other collateral attack procedures of a lower order than
habeas corpus utilized by the states and the federal courts vary
from the common law writ of coram nobis9 to post-conviction
4. FED. R. Cnmv. P. 37 (Appeal must be taken within ten days);
ALASKA R. Csnvr. P. 33 (motion for a new trial must be made within
five days).
5. The Constitution guarantees the common law right of habeas
corpus. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. Similarly, it is a right every
state must grant its citizens. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Levine v.
Fair, 186 Pa. Super. 299, 144 A.2d 395 (1958).
6. Ex parte Connor, 16 Cal. 2d 701, 108 P.2d 10 (1940), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Connor v. California, 313 U.S. 542 (1941).
7. Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393 (1924) (habeas corpus is a collateral
rather than appellate remedy); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964).
8. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. ([4 Pet.) 540 (1840). Recently
the Supreme Court held that a collateral attack motion in a federal
court would not be reviewed until all remedies still available in the
state courts had been exhausted. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
This corrected the situation in which a defendant, having failed to appeal
and precluded from it by lapse of time, did not have the right to make
a habeas corpus motion because he had. failed to exhaust all possible
state court remedies, notwithstanding the fact that they were no longer
available.
9. Coram nobis is a writ to correct a judgment in the same
court in which it was rendered, on the ground of error in fact. Follow-
ing the habeas corpus procedures in the federal court, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1964), the states have always had some kind of procedure
for relief on collateral attack. These systems called for appointment of
counsel at a collateral attack hearing at the court's discretion.
Alaska is not the first state to require counsel to be appointed at
such hearings. California, Maine, and New York have all held that an
indigent petitioner has the constitutional right to counsel at a collateral
attack hearing. See People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 297 P.2d 993,
42 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965); Duncan v. Robbins, 159 Me. 339, 193 A.2d 362
(1963); People v. Monahan, 17 N.Y.2d 310, 217 N.E.2d 664, 270 N.Y.S.2d
613 (1966); People v. Hughes, 15 N.Y.2d 172, 204 N.E.2d 849, 256 N.Y.S.
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remedies acts.10 These procedures allow consideration of errors
other than those reviewable under habeas corpus, yet they are
not nearly as broad as direct appeal.1 Like habeas corpus there
is no time limit and although res judicata may apply to issues
previously decided, successive motions may be brought.12
2d 803 (1965). But see Brine v. State, 205 A.2d 12 (Me. 1964).
The following state cases have recently reaffirmed retention of the
discretionary system. Woodward v. State, 42 Ala. App. 551, 171 So. 2d
462 (1965); State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1964); Austin v. State,
422 P.2d 71 (Idaho 1966); State v. Pelke, 143 Mont. 262, 389 P.2d 164
(1964); State v. Randolph, 32 Wis. 2d 1, 144 N.W.2d 441 (1966). This
conforms to the prevailing federal court policy. See Brown v. Cameron,
353 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Marshall v. Wil-
kins, 338 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v.
Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960).
For recent discussions in the area see also Kamisar, The Right to
Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most
Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1962); The Right
to Counsel: A Symposium, 45 MmnN. L. REV. 693 (1961).
10. Most of these statutes are modeled on the Uniform Post-Con-
viction Procedure Act, 9B UxiFomI LAWS ANN. § 352 (1957). See,
e.g., ALASKA R. CumU. P. 35(b) (1963); Illinois Post-Conviction Hear-
ing Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122 (1964); Maryland Post-Conviction
Procedure Act, Mn. A'N. CODE art. 27, §§ 645A-J (1967); Minnesota
Post-Conviction Remedy, Minn. Sess. Laws ch. 336, §§ 590.01-.06
(1967); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 7001-12 (McKinney
1963); North Carolina Post-Conviction Hearing Act, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 15-217-22 (Supp. 1965); Oregon Post-Conviction Hearing Act, ORE.
REV. STAT. §§ 138.510-.680, 34.330 (1965); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964); Uni-
form Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 9B UNuromv LAWS ANN. § 550
(1955). Some states provide the right to counsel at a post-conviction
hearing. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-4 (1965); Minn. Sess.
Laws ch. 336, § 590.06 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-219 (1965); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 138.590(3) (1965). But see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§
645A-J (1962). But these collateral remedies are not guaranteed by
the Constitution. Hampson v. Smith, 153 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1946);
People v. Liss, 14 N.Y.2d 570, 198 N.E.2d 45, 248 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1964).
But see Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957); Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, rehearing denied, 294 U.S. 732 (1934). Accord,
Ridge, The Indigent Defendant, 24 F.R.D. 241 (1960). See Note, State
Post-Conviction Remedies, 61 COLum. L. REV. 681 (1961).
11. Jones v. Squier, 195 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1952); Haywood v. United
States, 127 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). But see Sander v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1964) (28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) has the same scope as
habeas corpus). The proceeding need not take the form of a trial.
Taylor v. Alabama, 335 U.S. 252 (1948); Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411
(1942). Issues decided on appeal cannot be raised in nonjurisdic-
tional habeas corpus. Fernandey v. Culver, 98 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 904 (1958).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964); ALASKA R. CRuvr. P. 35(b) &
32(d) (1963), for representative scope of collateral attack hearings.
The Supreme Court's scope of review on habeas corpus tends to be
broad enough to make up for any narrowness of state collateral attack
hearings. See Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and
Federal Post-Conviction Review, 50 A.B.A.J. 928 (1964). See also Case
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Since collateral relief is discretionary, the court may or may
not hold a hearing, and if it holds a hearing it is also within the
court's discretion whether to provide an indigent with aid of
counsel. 18 In the past, federal and several state courts have
held that if a case is complex the court should appoint counsel
for an indigent appellant. 4 Failure to appoint counsel in such
a case may leave the conviction open to attack on the basis of
denial of due process. But in the past this standard has been
thought to be adequate, since collateral attack has traditionally
been considered to be a civil proceeding in which no right to
counsel exists at any stage.' 5
Prior to the instant case, the Alaska Supreme Court had
held that under an Alaska statute an indigent defendant has
the right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing. 6 How-
ever, the court left open the question of whether the right to
counsel would exist at the hearing of a collateral attack motion.
Furthermore, in State v. Thompson.,7 the court held that at a
hearing on a collateral attack motion, if the petitioner sets out
sufficient facts to indicate the trial court's decision may be erro-
neous, the court must then hold a full fact hearing and create a
record which could later be reviewed.'8 Nichols then posed the
issue whether the right to counsel should be extended one step
further to include the hearing phase of the criminal judicial
process.
v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965); Note, State Post-Conviction Reme-
dies, 61 COLTum. L. REV. 681 (1961).
13. Brown v. Cameron, 353 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United
States ex rel. Marshall v. Wilkins, 338 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1964). Recently
the Supreme Court has denied certiorari on the issue of whether appel-
lants have the constitutional right to counsel at a collateral attack
hearing. Huizar v. United States, 339 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 959 (1965).
14. Fleming v. United States, 367 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1966); Mitchell
v. United States, 359 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1966); Baker v. United States,
334 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964); State v. Pelke, 143 Mont. 262, 389 P.2d
164 (1964).
15. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959);
Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965) (petitioner has
passed beyond the stage of an accused).
16. Hoffman v. State, 404 P.2d 644 (Alas. 1965). ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.110 (1963): "When sentence has been suspended, it shall not be
revoked except for good cause shown. In all proceedings for the
revocation of a suspended sentence, the defendant is entitled to reason-
able notice and the right to be represented by counsel." [Emphasis
added].
17. 412 P.2d 628 (Alas. 1966).
18. Id. at 635-37. See also Shipman v. California, 62 Cal. 2d 226,
397 P.2d 993, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965).
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The Nichols court found that under the equal protection
clause of the Alaska Constitution, once petitioner had been
granted a hearing, he had the right to have court appointed
counsel represent him at that hearing. The court reviewed re-
cent Supreme Court and state court decisions establishing the
rights of indigent defendants in other phases of criminal pro-
cedure and concluded that the trend was toward the position
that failure to provide counsel at such hearings would result in
an invidious discrimination between the rich and the poor which
would be unconstitutional.' 9 In the court's opinion a rich man
would undoubtedly be represented by counsel at such a hearing,
and, therefore, if an indigent were denied counsel, it would be a
discrimination against him.
The court reasoned that after petitioner gained the right to
a hearing, the quality of the hearing would depend on whether
he had the assistance of counsel. At the hearing the petitioner
must present a prima facie case, including evidence which
would have been sufficient, if presented at his trial, to have
altered its outcome. In addition, he must show why he did not
appeal or why this evidence was not presented upon direct
appeal. If the petitioner has assistance of counsel, the record of
the case can be examined, hidden merits in his motion found,
points of law researched, witnesses examined, and arguments
clearly and completely presented to the court.20  An indigent
defendant without counsel would not have these advantages;
consequently, the hearing would be of significantly less value to
him and, thus, would not comport with fair procedure. The court
then concluded that the principle that all men are equal before
the law is violated when the meaningfulness of a hearing depends
on whether the petitioner has the means to retain counsel.
There are many practical reasons supporting the system of
19. In this regard, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held
that, under the sixth and fourteenth amendments, a state must appoint
counsel to a defendant charged with a felony. Obviously this left
open the question whether indigents charged with misdemeanors and
other offenses have the constitutional right to counsel.
But in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), decided only a
few days later, it was held that on direct appeal all prisoners are
entitled to the assistance of counsel-presumably misdemeanants in-
cluded. This is a curious overlap that no doubt points to the day when
all defendants will have the constitutional right to counsel on any of-
fense. Douglas also left open the question whether an appellant
would be entitled to counsel on successive appeals. See also In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963). See also
Powell v. Alabama, 378 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
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discretionary appointment of counsel in collateral attack. Most
such motions are made by prisoners in jail who simply write
motion after motion expressing the desire to be freed without
giving legal reasons.2 ' Consequently, the vast majority of these
petitions are found to be frivolous even after a hearing is
granted.22 For this reason the mandatory appointment of coun-
sel is often viewed as a needless expense, especially since the
petitioner has already had the right to a direct appeal with the
aid of counsel. 23
Furthermore, reforms in the area of aid to indigents must
be made only after balancing the need for such aid in other areas
of criminal procedure. Indigent defendants have not yet been
afforded the consitutional right to counsel in misdemeanor cases,
while at the collateral attack phase a petitioner may have had
the aid of counsel at trial and on appeal. Therefore, it is reason-
able to anticipate that some jurisdictions may be reluctant to
provide this additional aid to indigents.
Additional standards for the appointment of counsel could
be formulated which would improve the discretionary system
without making the right to counsel a constitutional imperative.
The nonconstitutional standard is now based on the complexity
of the issues;24 the additional rule that an appellant is guaranteed
the aid of counsel if the issues of the case have never been liti-
gated would retain the flexibility of the discretionary rule
while assuring one hearing of every indigent's case in open
court and with the aid of counsel. These criteria would cover
confession and coerced plea cases. On an appeal in which there
has been a trial, additional factors would be required before a
court would exercise its discretion in granting the assistance of
counsel. New laws altering the basis for petitioner's conviction
21. Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Review, 33 F.R.D. 363,
494 (1964). See Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceed-
ings, 45 M_.N. L. REv. 783 (1961).
22. See Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNML
L.Q. 401, 406-08 (1960). Claims for certiorari "are often fantastic"
and "are for the most part frivolous." Accord, Cerniglia v. United
States, 230 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Ill. 1964). However, the Court does re-
view the handwritten motions to sift out those with merit. If it does
grant a hearing it does so obviously because it sees the possible merit
in the case. Therefore it may be expected to be understanding of peti-
tioner's lack of expertise.
23. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). In this respect it
should be noted that many collateral attack motions now before the
Court probably are from cases decided before Douglas when there was
no constitutional right to counsel on appeal.
24. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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would be a compelling reason to reexamine the issues and would
also strongly suggest that counsel be appointed. This appears
to be a reasonable system that could be initiated without major
alteration of the discretionary system. However, even this pro-
cedure does not alleviate discriminations among prisoners based
on ability to pay. Therefore, this should be considered only a
temporary measure while the constitutionally based Nichols rule
should ultimately be accepted as the ideal system.
Although Nichols does not decide whether an indigent peti-
tioner has the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel
in preparing his motion for a hearing, this appears to be the next
phase in post-conviction review at which counsel would be valu-
able.2 5 Probably the most difficult hurdle to clear in gaining
relief through collateral attack is persuading a court to grant a
hearing originally. The petitioner has to present a legal argu-
ment in his motion and bear the burden of persuasion. It is
obvious to those trained in the law that a layman cannot present
as strong a case before a court as a lawyer. As a consequence it
is unfair that an indigent must face the court without counsel,
especially when representation of counsel before judicial tribu-
nals is recognized as a basic right at prior stages in the criminal
process.26l However, if counsel is guaranteed at this later phase,
it is feared that counsel may be required to assist prisoners in
preparing endless collateral attack motions to present to the
court.27 This is objected to on the basis that it would degrade
counsel and that the efforts of trained lawyers and the courts
would be fruitlessly expended in repeatedly reviewing the allega-
25. This issue will be raised only in a case where petitioner's
collateral attack motion and hearing are denied. The case must then be
remanded, not to hold a hearing, but to grant petitioner the aid of
counsel in preparing his motion.
26. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Hoffman v.
State, 404 P.2d 644 (Alas. 1965). Recent Supreme Court decisions
have extended the indigent's right to counsel both before and after
conviction in all phases of criminal procedure. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1(1967); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Coppedge
v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Eskridge v. Washington
State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Ellis v.
United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S.
565 (1957); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Parnell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932). See also A. LEwis, GIDoN's TRUMPET (1964).
27. Maine has already decided that an indigent does not have the
right to counsel in the preparation of a writ coram nobis. Brine v.
State, 160 Me. 401, 205 A.2d 12 (1964).
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tions of indigent prisoners. Such a process would be limited
only by the whim of the prisoners, and much effort would no
doubt be expended on reviewing the work of previous counsel.
An unreasonable portion of the appellate court's time would be
spent reviewing long and technical briefs of counsel in prepara-
tion for actions of questionable merit. But even judges who
fear the burden of increased appeals and motions are quick to
point out that the criminal law is to punish only the guilty and
that no efforts should be spared to free the innocent from unjust
imprisonment.28 A collateral attack motion is the prisoner's
only remaining route to freedom.
Even a system which allows indigents the constitutional
right to the aid of counsel in preparing collateral attack motions
may not be overly burdensome. The motions may be so limited
that the danger of repetitive requests for counsel would not be a
serious threat to the time of courts and attorneys. One review
of an indigent's record by an attorney could be granted as of
right if the prisoner asks for it and has established some basis
to support his plea for release. This would provide a fair system
of allocating legal aid for all prisoners who feel they have been
convicted unjustly. After that perhaps a discretionary system
of appointed counsel would be adequate in future phases, and
then only after a strong showing by the prisoner that, only with
the aid of counsel, could a substantial issue be prepared for re-
view by the court at a hearing.2 This would provide a reason-
able standard for extending the benefit of counsel for indigents
to the last phase in the criminal process, and would be a further
step toward equal treatment of rich ard poor.
Although the practical reasons for resistance to granting the
right to counsel in all phases of collateral attack are substantial,
they are not persuasive. Justice requires the equal treatment
of rich and poor. If our legal system provides these remedies,
they should be available to all. Although it has been declared
after each decision extending the right to counsel that the courts
will be deluged by petitions, thus tendering an overwhelming
financial burden in supplying counsel, this has not been the
case.3 0 Notwithstanding the backlog of prisoners who have been
28. Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Review, 33 F.R.D. 363, 504(1964).
29. See forms used by the United States District Court, Northern
District of Illinois, 33 F.R.D. 391-408 (1964).
30. Justice Clark, dissenting in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
359 (1963), said: "With this new fetish for indigency the Court piles
an intolerable burden on the State's judicial machinery."
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